| Abstract: | Philippa Foot's version of ethical naturalism, centered on the idea of “natural goodness,” has received a good deal of critical scrutiny. One pervasive criticism contends that less than virtuous modes of conduct may be described as naturally good or, at least, not naturally defective on her account. If true, this contradicts the most ambitious aspect of Foot's naturalistic approach to ethics: to show that judgments of moral goodness are a subclass of judgments of natural goodness. But even if one finds this line of criticism convincing, there is a less ambitious aspect of Foot's project which remains, at least in a qualified way, defensible: her conception of moral reasoning as a legitimate form of practical rationality. This more modest claim turns not on the view that moral judgments are a subclass of judgments of natural goodness but merely on the idea that moral reasoning itself is naturally good for us. |
