A critique to the significance of Gettier counter-examples |
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Authors: | Jianbo Cao |
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Affiliation: | (1) Department of Philosophy, Fudan University, Shanghai, 200433, China;(2) Department of Philosophy, Xiamen University, Xiamen, 361005, China |
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Abstract: | Usually, people think that Gettier counter-examples challenged the traditional tripartite definition of knowledge and fundamentally changed the characteristic of the contemporary epistemology. This paper argues that regard for Gettier counter-examples is exaggerated, because (i) the JTB definition is neither an important nor a comprehensive one that covers all knowledge. Moreover, the significance of Gettier counter-examples is limited. (ii) The source of Gettier counter-examples lies in one arbitrary judgment, two mix-ups, three false assumptions, and a misunderstanding about the JTB definition. __________ Translated from Fudan Xuebao 复旦学报 (Fudan Journal), 2004 (5) |
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Keywords: | epistemology Gettier counter-examples definition of knowledge |
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