Intransitivity and Vague Preferences |
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Authors: | Jonathan Aldred |
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Institution: | (1) Emmanuel College, Cambridge, UK, CB2 3AP |
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Abstract: | This paper is concerned with intransitivity in normative rational choice. It focuses on a class of intransitivities which
have received little attention, those involving vague preferences. “Vague preferences” are defined in terms of vague predicates
such as “red” or “bald.” Such preferences appear common, and intransitive indifference is argued to be an unavoidable feature
of them. Such preferences are argued to undermine intransitive strict preference also. Various formal theories of vagueness
are applied to an example of vague preferences, but none of them provide a justification for the transitivity axiom.
For helpful comments on earlier drafts and discussions of this material, I am very grateful to John Broome, Rosanna Keefe,
Matthew Kramer, Stuart Rachels, Jochen Runde and Adrian Walsh. I owe a large debt to John O’Neill, who suggested an earlier
version of the “Tragedy of the Disappearing Commons” example. |
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Keywords: | preference rational choice theory rationality transitivity vagueness |
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