Consciousness

Various reflections on the nature of consciousness, partly inspired by Alastair Hannay's views on the subject, are presented. In particular, its reality as a distinct non-physical existence is defended against such alternatives as have dominated philosophy for many years. The main difficulty in such a defense concerns the contingency it seems to imply as to the relations between consciousness and its expression in behaviour. But it only implies such contingency if some version of the Humean principle that there cannot be necessary connections between distinct existences is assumed. It is more promising to see this relation as the falsification of this Humean principle and thus avoid what seems the main recommendation of behaviourism, functionalism etc. Some final reflections on the nature of the physical suggest that something like consciousness may be the noumenal essence of the physical in general.I must express my warm thanks to Alastair Hannay and Dagfinn Føllesdal, and to the organisers of the conference in Oslo who arranged to celebrate their sixtieth birthdays, for having been invited to participate. As I was a graduate student with Alastair Hannay at University College, London, when A. J. Ayer was the head of the department, and am his almost exact contemporary, I have taken the opportunity for some reflections on the way philosophy of mind has gone over the intervening years. This article retains some of the informality of style which was appropriate for such an occasion.