| Abstract: | Many studies probe for interpretations of < if A then C> by having people evaluate truth-table cases (<A and C>, < A and not-C>, < not-A and C>, < not-A and not-C>) as making the rule true or false, or being irrelevant. We argue that a single case can never prove a general rule to be true, as philosophy of science has taught any researcher. Giving participants the impossible “true” option would therefore bias results away from this response. In Experiment 1 people judged instead whether cases make a rule false, do not make the rule false, or are irrelevant to the rule. The experimental group (N = 44) showed a significant increase in not-false responses compared with true responses of the control group (N = 39). In Experiments 2 and 3 the experimental groups judged whether cases make a rule true, corroborate it (i.e., make the rule more plausible, but neither true nor false), make it false, or are irrelevant. There was a significant reduction of irrelevant responses as compared to the default true/false/irrelevant task for the control groups. Even < A and C> cases were often no longer considered to make an < if A then C> rule true and were correctly judged to corroborate (vs. verify) rules. Results corroborate our conceptual analyses of the unsuitable “true” response option and put into question arguments that hinge on the presumed likelihood by which people consider truth contingencies to make a rule “true”. |
