Naturalism,fallibilism, and the a priori |
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Authors: | Lisa Warenski |
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Affiliation: | (1) Philosophy, Union College, Humanities 216B, 807 Union Street, Schenectady, NY 12308, USA |
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Abstract: | This paper argues that a priori justification is, in principle, compatible with naturalism—if the a priori is understood in a way that is free of the inessential properties that, historically, have been associated with the concept. I argue that empirical indefeasibility is essential to the primary notion of the a priori; however, the indefeasibility requirement should be interpreted in such a way that we can be fallibilist about apriori-justified claims. This fallibilist notion of the a priori accords with the naturalist’s commitment to scientific methodology in that it allows for apriori-justified claims to be sensitive to further conceptual developments and the expansion of evidence. The fallibilist apriorist allows that an a priori claim is revisable in only a purely epistemic sense. This modal claim is weaker than what is required for a revisability thesis to establish empiricism, so fallibilist apriorism represents a distinct position. |
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Keywords: | Naturalism Fallibilism A priori Epistemic possibility |
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