Consciousness,Higher-Order Content,and the Individuation of Vehicles |
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Authors: | Kriegel Uriah |
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Affiliation: | (1) Department of Philosophy, Brown University, Box 1918, Providence, RI, 02912, USA E-mail |
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Abstract: | One of the distinctive properties of conscious states is thepeculiar self-awareness implicit in them. Two rival accounts of this self-awareness are discussed. Accordingto a Neo-Brentanian account, a mental state M is conscious iff M represents its very own occurrence.According to the Higher-Order Monitoring account, M is merely accompanied by a numerically distinctrepresentation of its occurrence. According to both, then, M is conscious in virtue of figuring in a higher-ordercontent. The disagreement is over the question whether the higher-order content is carried by Mitself or by a different state. While theNeo-Brentanian theory is phenomenologically more attractive, it isoften felt to be somewhat mysterious. It is argued (i) that the difference between the Neo-Brentanian andHigher-Order Monitoring theories is smaller and more empirical than may initially seem, and (ii) that theNeo-Brentanian theory can be readily demystified. These considerations make it prima faciepreferable to the Higher-Order Monitoring theory. |
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