The felt presence of other minds: Predictive processing,counterfactual predictions,and mentalising in autism |
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| Institution: | 1. Cognition and Philosophy Lab, Philosophy Department, Monash University, Clayton, Victoria 3800, Australia;2. Sackler Centre for Consciousness Science, School of Engineering and Informatics, University of Sussex, Brighton BN1 9QJ, UK;1. School of Health Sciences and Psychology, Federation University, Northways Road, Churchill, Victoria 3842, Australia;2. Cognition & Philosophy Laboratory, Monash University, Clayton Road, Clayton, Victoria 3800, Australia;1. School of Psychology, UNSW Australia, Sydney, New South Wales, Australia;2. School of Biological and Chemical Sciences, Psychology, Queen Mary University of London, London, UK;3. Faculty of Law and Letters, Ehime University, Matsuyama, Ehime, Japan;4. School of Social Sciences and Psychology, The University of Western Sydney, Bankstown, New South Wales, Australia;1. Institut Jean Nicod, CNRS UMR 8129, Institut d''Etude de la Cognition, École Normale Supérieure & PSL Research University, 29 rue d''Ulm, 75005 Paris, France;2. Department of Neuroscience, Biotech Campus – University of Geneva, 1211 Geneva, Switzerland;3. Centre de Recherche Cerveau et Cognition, Université de Toulouse, UPS-CNRS, Place du Docteur Baylac, Pavillon Baudot, 31059 Toulouse, France;4. Laboratoire Psychologie de la Perception, CNRS UMR 8242, Université Paris-Descartes, 45, rue des Saints-Pères, 75006 Paris, France;5. INSERM U955, IMRB, University Paris Est Creteil, AP-HP, Henri Mondor-Albert Chenevier Hospitals, Department of Psychiatry, Fondation FondaMental, French National Science Foundation, 40 rue de Mesly, 94000 Créteil, France;1. Laboratory of Experimental Psychology, Brain & Cognition, KU Leuven, 3000 Leuven, Belgium;2. Leuven Autism Research (LAuRes), KU Leuven, 3000 Leuven, Belgium;3. Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, UPC KU Leuven, 3000 Leuven, Belgium;1. Department of Cognitive Science, Central European University, Budapest, Hungary;2. Department of Philosophy, Radboud University, Nijmegen, Netherlands |
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| Abstract: | The mental states of other people are components of the external world that modulate the activity of our sensory epithelia. Recent probabilistic frameworks that cast perception as unconscious inference on the external causes of sensory input can thus be expanded to enfold the brain’s representation of others’ mental states. This paper examines this subject in the context of the debate concerning the extent to which we have perceptual awareness of other minds. In particular, we suggest that the notion of perceptual presence helps to refine this debate: are others’ mental states experienced as veridical qualities of the perceptual world around us? This experiential aspect of social cognition may be central to conditions such as autism spectrum disorder, where representations of others’ mental states seem to be selectively compromised. Importantly, recent work ties perceptual presence to the counterfactual predictions of hierarchical generative models that are suggested to perform unconscious inference in the brain. This enables a characterisation of mental state representations in terms of their associated counterfactual predictions, allowing a distinction between spontaneous and explicit forms of mentalising within the framework of predictive processing. This leads to a hypothesis that social cognition in autism spectrum disorder is characterised by a diminished set of counterfactual predictions and the reduced perceptual presence of others’ mental states. |
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| Keywords: | Predictive coding Autism Mentalising Theory of mind Social cognition Presence Veridicality Counterfactuals Active inference |
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