On Direct Social Perception |
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| Affiliation: | 1. Laboratory of Neuropsychiatry, Department of Clinical and Behavioral Neurology, IRCCS Santa Lucia Foundation, Rome, Italy;2. Department of Neurosciences, Psychology, Drug Research and Child Health, University of Florence, Italy;3. Department of Psychology, Sapienza University of Rome, Italy;4. Laboratoire des Neurosciences Cognitives UMR 7291, Aix-Marseille University, CNRS, Marseille, France;5. Division of Neuropsychiatry, Menninger Department of Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences, Baylor College of Medicine, Houston, TX, United States;1. Behavioural Basis of Health, Griffith Health Institute and School of Applied Psychology, Griffith University, Brisbane, Australia;2. School of Psychology, The University of Queensland, Brisbane, Australia;3. Neuropsychology Applied Cognitive Neuroscience Lab, Key Laboratory of Mental Health, Institute of Psychology, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China |
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| Abstract: | Direct Social Perception (DSP) is the idea that we can non-inferentially perceive others’ mental states. In this paper, I argue that the standard way of framing DSP leaves the debate at an impasse. I suggest two alternative interpretations of the idea that we see others’ mental states: others’ mental states are represented in the content of our perception, and we have basic perceptual beliefs about others’ mental states. I argue that the latter interpretation of DSP is more promising and examine the kinds of mental states that plausibly could satisfy this version of DSP. |
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| Keywords: | Social cognition Perception Inference Content of perception Theory of mind |
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