Assessing two competing approaches to the psychology of moral judgments |
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Authors: | Christian B Miller |
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Institution: | Department of Philosophy, Wake Forest University, Winston-Salem, NC, USA |
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Abstract: | This paper brings together the social intuitionist view of the psychology of moral judgments developed by Jonathan Haidt, and the recent morphological rationalist position of Terry Horgan and Mark Timmons. I will end up suggesting that Horgan and Timmons have offered us a more plausible account of the psychology of moral judgment formation. But the view is not without its own difficulties. Indeed, one of them might prove to be quite serious, as it could support a form of skepticism about understanding our own motivating reasons. |
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Keywords: | Haidt Timmons Horgan morphological rationalism social intuitionism moral psychology confabulation reasons deliberation skepticism |
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