Collective Intentionality,Evolutionary Biology and Social Reality1

Abstract

The paper aims to clarify and scrutinize Searle”s somewhat puzzling statement that collective intentionality is a biologically primitive phenomenon. It is argued that the statement is not only meant to bring out that “collective intentionality” is not further analyzable in terms of individual intentionality. It also is meant to convey that we have a biologically evolved innate capacity for collective intentionality.The paper points out that Searle”s dedication to a strong notion of collective intentionality considerably delimits the scope of his endeavor. Furthermore, evolutionary theory does not vindicate that an innate capacity for collective intentionality is a necessary precondition for cooperative behavior. ^{1 1}Useful comments made by the participants of the Amsterdam seminar in Philosophy and History of Economics (11 November 2002), by the participants of the Third Workshop in Collective Intentionality (Rotterdam, 12-14 December 2002), and by the editors of this special issue are gratefully acknowledged. I also want to thank an anonymous referee for making helpful suggestions.