A defense of local miracle compatibilism |
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| Authors: | Peter A Graham |
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| Institution: | (1) Department of Philosophy, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, 352 Bartlett Hall, 130 Hicks Way, Amherst, MA, 01003-9269, USA |
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| Abstract: | David Lewis has offered a reply to the standard argument for the claim that the truth of determinism is incompatible with
anyone’s being able to do otherwise than she in fact does. Helen Beebee has argued that Lewis’s compatibilist strategy is
untenable. In this paper I show that one recent attempt to defend Lewis’s view against this argument fails and then go on
to offer my own defense of Lewis’s view.
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| Keywords: | Compatibilism Incompatibilism Free Will Ability |
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