Finite rational self-deceivers |
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| Authors: | D S Neil Van Leeuwen |
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| Institution: | (1) Department of Philosophy, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305, USA |
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| Abstract: | I raise three puzzles concerning self-deception: (i) a conceptual paradox, (ii) a dilemma about how to understand human cognitive
evolution, and (iii) a tension between the fact of self-deception and Davidson’s interpretive view. I advance solutions to
the first two and lay a groundwork for addressing the third. The capacity for self-deception, I argue, is a spandrel, in Gould’s and Lewontin’s sense, of other mental traits, i.e., a structural byproduct. The irony is that the mental traits
of which self-deception is a spandrel/byproduct are themselves rational.
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| Keywords: | Self-deception Rationality Paradox Evolutionary psychology Spandrel Adaptation Belief Epistemic norm Attention |
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