The Rationale Behind Revision-Rule Semantics |
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Authors: | Lionel Shapiro |
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Affiliation: | (1) Department of Philosophy, University of Pittsburgh, 1001 Cathedral of Learning, Pittsburgh, PA 15260, USA |
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Abstract: | According to Gupta and Belnap, the “extensional behavior” of ‘true’ matches that of a circularly defined predicate. Besides promising to explain semantic paradoxicality, their general theory of circular predicates significantly liberalizes the framework of truth-conditional semantics. The authors’ discussions of the rationale behind that liberalization invoke two distinct senses in which a circular predicate’s semantic behavior is explained by a “revision rule” carrying hypothetical information about its extension. Neither attempted explanation succeeds. Their theory may however be modified to employ a relativized notion of extension. The resulting contextualist semantics for ‘true’ construes circularity as a pragmatic phenomenon. |
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