Consciousness and the Moral Permissibility of Infanticide1 |
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Authors: | NICOLE HASSOUN URIAH KRIEGEL |
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Affiliation: | 1. Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA 1213—3890, USA;2. University of Sydney, Sydney, NSW 2006, Australia |
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Abstract: | abstract In this paper, we present a conditional argument for the moral permissibility of some kinds of infanticide. The argument is based on a certain view of consciousness and the claim that there is an intimate connection between consciousness and infanticide. In bare outline, the argument is this: it is impermissible to intentionally kill a creature only if the creature is conscious; it is reasonable to believe that there is some time at which human infants are not conscious; therefore, it is reasonable to believe that it is permissible to intentionally kill some human infants. |
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