Quantification and Ontology |
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Authors: | Lavine Shaughan |
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Affiliation: | (1) Department of Philosophy, The University of Arizona, P.O. Box 210027, Tucson, Arizona, 85721-0027, U.S.A. |
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Abstract: | Quineans have taken the basic expression of ontological commitment to be an assertion of the form ' x ', assimilated to theEnglish 'there is something that is a '. Here I take the existential quantifier to be introduced, not as an abbreviation for an expression of English, but via Tarskian semantics. I argue, contrary to the standard view, that Tarskian semantics in fact suggests a quite different picture: one in which quantification is of a substitutional type apparently first proposed by Geach. The ontological burden is borne by constant symbols, and truth is defined separately from reference. |
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