Towards a pluralistic neurobiological understanding of consciousness |
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| Institution: | 1. Neuroscience Institute, New York University Grossman School of Medicine, New York, NY 10016, USA;2. Departments of Neurology, Neuroscience and Physiology, Radiology, New York University Grossman School of Medicine, New York, NY 10016;1. Department of Psychology, Western University, London, ON N6A 5B7, Canada;2. Department of Psychology, Durham University, Durham DH1 3LE, UK;1. Neuroscience Institute and Psychology Department, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA, USA;2. Department of Ophthalmology, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA, USA;1. Department of Experimental Psychology & All Souls College, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK;1. Department of Psychology, Western University, London, ON N6A 5B7, Canada;2. Department of Psychology, Durham University, Durham DH1 3LE, UK;1. Laboratoire d’Étude des Mécanismes Cognitifs, Université de Lyon, 5 avenue Pierre Mendès France, 69676 Bron Cedex, France;2. Institut Universitaire de France, 1 rue Descartes, 75231 Paris Cedex 5, France;3. IRCCS Synlab SDN S.p.A., Via Emanuele Gianturco 113, 80143, Naples, Italy;4. Aix-Marseille Univ, CNRS, LPC, 3 Place Victor Hugo, 13331 Marseille, France;1. Department of Cognitive Psychology, Universität Hamburg, Von-Melle-Park 5, 20146 Hamburg, Germany;2. Department of Systems Neuroscience, University Medical Center Hamburg-Eppendorf, 20246 Hamburg, Germany |
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| Abstract: | Theories of consciousness are often based on the assumption that a single, unified neurobiological account will explain different types of conscious awareness. However, recent findings show that, even within a single modality such as conscious visual perception, the anatomical location, timing, and information flow of neural activity related to conscious awareness vary depending on both external and internal factors. This suggests that the search for generic neural correlates of consciousness may not be fruitful. I argue that consciousness science requires a more pluralistic approach and propose a new framework: joint determinant theory (JDT). This theory may be capable of accommodating different brain circuit mechanisms for conscious contents as varied as percepts, wills, memories, emotions, and thoughts, as well as their integrated experience. |
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