Practical and scientific rationality: A difficulty for Levi's epistemology |
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Authors: | Wayne Backman |
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Affiliation: | 1. Dept. of Philosophy, University of Cincinnati, 45221, Cincinnati, OH, USA
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Abstract: | Traditionally scientific rationality has been distinguished from mere practical rationality. It has seemed that it is sometimes rational to accept statements for the purposes of particular practical deliberations even though it would not be rational to count them as having been confirmed by science. Isaac Levi contends that this traditional view is mistaken. He thinks that there should be a single standard of acceptance for all purposes, scientific and practical. The author contends that Levi has given no good reason for identifying scientific with practical rationality. And he argues that Levi's own theory is inconsistent with the thesis that a scientist should use a single standard of acceptance in all his scientific deliberations. |
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