Problems for Moral Twin Earth Arguments* |
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Authors: | Joshua Gert |
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Institution: | (1) Department of Philosophy, The Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL, 32306, U.S.A. |
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Abstract: | Terry Horgan and Mark Timmons have recently presented a series of papers in which they argue against what has come to be called
the ‘new wave’ moral realism and moral semantics of David Brink, Richard Boyd, Peter Railton, and a number of other philosophers.
The central idea behind Horgan and Timmons’s criticism of these ‘new wave’ theories has been extended by Sean Holland to include
the sort of realism that drops out of response-dependent accounts that make use of an analogy between moral properties and
secondary qualities. This paper argues that Holland’s extension depends crucially on the fact that his target is a direct response-dependent account of moral value. His argument does not work against such accounts of more basic normative notions such as ‘harm’ or ‘benefit’. And
these more basic notions may then serve as the basic normative building blocks for an indirectly response-dependent moral
theory.
* Thanks to Mark Timmons for helpful and friendly comments on an earlier version of this paper, and also to an audience at
the 2003 Pacific APA, and to the reviewers
for this journal. |
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Keywords: | |
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