A Metacompatibilist Account of Free Will: Making Compatibilists and Incompatibilists More Compatible |
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Authors: | Waller Bruce N. |
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Affiliation: | (1) Department of Philosophy & Religious Studies, Youngstown State University, Youngstown, OH, 44555, USA, E-mail |
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Abstract: | The debate over free will has pittedlibertarian insistence on open alternativesagainst the compatibilist view that authenticcommitments can preserve free will in adetermined world. A second schism in the freewill debate sets rationalist belief in thecentrality of reason against nonrationalistswho regard reason as inessential or even animpediment to free will. By looking deeperinto what motivates each of these perspectivesit is possible to find common ground thataccommodates insights from all those competingviews. The resulting metacompatibilist view offree will bridges some of the differencesbetween compatibilists and incompatibilists aswell as between rationalists andnonrationalists, and results in a free willtheory that is both more philosophicallyinclusive and more firmly connected tocontemporary research in psychology andbiology. |
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