Kamm on Inviolability and Agent-Relative Restrictions |
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Authors: | Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen |
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Institution: | (1) Section of Philosophy, Department of Media, Cognition, and Communication, University of Copenhagen, Njalsgade 80, 2300 Copenhagen S, Denmark |
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Abstract: | Agent-relative restrictions prohibit minimizing violations: that is, they require us not to minimize the total number of their
violations by violating them ourselves. Frances Kamm has explained this prohibition in terms of the moral worth of persons,
which, in turn, she explains in terms of persons’ high moral status as inviolable beings. I press the following criticism
of this account: even if minimizing violations are permissible, we need not have a lower moral status provided other determinants
thereof boost it. Thus, Kamm’s account is incomplete at best. And when, to address this incompleteness, it is insisted that
our moral worth derives from specific moral statuses, the inviolability account comes to seem deficient because it begs the
question against those who are not initially persuaded that minimizing violations are impermissible.
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Keywords: | Deontology Agent-relative restrictions Inviolability Moral status Frances M Kamm |
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