The cognitive representation of intending not to act: Evidence for specific non-action-effect binding |
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| Authors: | Simone Kühn Marcel Brass |
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| Institution: | 1. Department of Psychology, Max Planck Institute for Human Cognitive and Brain Sciences, Stephanstr. 1A, 04103 Leipzig, Germany;2. Ghent University, Faculty of Psychology and Educational Sciences, Department of Experimental Psychology, Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Gent, Belgium;2. Neuropsychology Unit, I.R.C.C.S., Fondazione Santa Lucia, Roma, Italy;3. Department of Psychology, University of Bologna, Italy;4. School of Life & Health Sciences, Aston University, Birmingham, UK;5. Dipartimento di Psicologia, Università Sapienza degli Studi di Roma, Italy;1. Communication Sciences and Disorders, The College of St. Rose, Albany, New York;2. Communication Sciences and Disorders, The Pennsylvania State University, State College, Pennsylvania;1. Helen Wills Neuroscience Institute, University of California-Berkeley, Berkeley, CA 94720, USA;2. Champalimaud Research, Champalimaud Centre for the Unknown, Lisbon 1400-038, Portugal;3. Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Sciences, University of California-Berkeley, Berkeley, CA, 94720, USA;4. Department of Neuroscience and Neurology, Zuckerman Mind Brain Behavior Institute, Columbia University, New York, NY 10027, USA;5. Joint Graduate Group in Bioengineering UCB/UCSF, Berkeley, CA 94720, USA |
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| Abstract: | The question how we represent voluntary action on a cognitive level has recently become of increasing interest to researchers studying motor control. However, so far it has been neglected how we represent the voluntary omission of an action. In our attempt to investigate the representation of voluntary non-actions we demonstrated binding effects between voluntary non-actions and subsequent action effects (Kühn, Elsner, Prinz, & Brass, 2009). That study, however, only distinguished between acting or not acting, and did not address the question of whether non-actions are coded as general omissions or whether they can be encoded specifically as the actual negation of the action in question (“not-right” or “not-left”). Our current study provides first evidence for the specificity of representations of intentional non-actions. Additionally, we compare two ways in which the specific non-actions might be represented: an ironic representation account implying that negations are prone to be omitted and a reformulated representation account assuming that the negated action is suppressed and/or the alternative action is facilitated. Our results suggest that the representation of non-actions contains a facilitation of the alternative action rather than a suppression of the action in question. |
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