When to think like an epistemicist |
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Authors: | Matthew Mosdell |
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Institution: | University of Utah, Salt Lake City, UT, USA. |
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Abstract: | Epistemicism is the view that seemingly vague predicates are not in fact vague. Consequently, there must be a sharp boundary between a man who is bald and one who is not bald. Although such a view is often met with incredulity, my aim is to provide a defense of epistemicism in this essay. My defense, however, is backhanded: I argue that the formal commitments of epistemicism are the result of good practical reasoning, not metaphysical necessity. To get to that conclusion, I spend most of the essay arguing that using a formal system like classical logic to manage seemingly vague situations requires practical principles to mediate between the formalism and what it aims to represent. |
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Keywords: | Vagueness epistemicism sorites paradox practical reason |
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