Properties,laws, and worlds |
| |
Authors: | Deborah C. Smith |
| |
Affiliation: | Department of Philosophy, Kent State University, Kent, OH 44242, USA |
| |
Abstract: | Jonathan Schaffer argues against a necessary connection between properties and laws. He takes this to be a question of what possible worlds we ought to countenance in our best theories of modality, counterfactuals, etc. In doing so, he unfairly rigs the game in favor of contingentism. I argue that the necessitarian can resist Schaffer’s conclusion while accepting his key premise that our best theories of modality, counterfactuals, etc. require a very wide range of things called ‘possible worlds’. However, the necessitarian can and should insist that, in many cases, these worlds are not metaphysically possible. I will further argue that, having taken such a stance, the necessitarian has additional resources to respond to Schaffer’s other arguments against the view. |
| |
Keywords: | Properties laws quidditism possible worlds impossible worlds necessitarianism contingentism |
|
|