Betting Against Compatibilism |
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Authors: | Göran Duus-Otterström |
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Institution: | (1) Department of Political Science, University of Gothenburg, P.O. Box 711, 405 30 Gothenburg, Sweden |
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Abstract: | Some argue that libertarianism represents the riskier incompatibilist view when it comes to the free will problem. An ethically
cautious incompatibilist should bet that we are not free in the sense required for moral responsibility, these theorists claim,
as doing so means that we no longer run the risk of holding the morally innocent responsible. In this paper, I show that the
same reasoning also advises us to bet against compatibilism. Supposing that we are unsure about whether or not the causal
order of the world is compatible with the kind of freedom that is required for moral responsibility, an ethically cautious
approach would once again bet that hard incompatibilism is true. |
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