Intrinsic properties |
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Authors: | Theodore Sider |
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Affiliation: | (1) Department of Philosophy, University of Rochester, 351 Dewey Hall, 14627-0078 Rochester, NY, USA |
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Abstract: | Conclusion It seems that no quasi-logical analysis of naturalness, intrinsicality, or duplication is possible; this at least in part lends credibility to the practice of taking one as a primitive. And I have argued that Lewis's analysis of intrinsicality is indeed successful, Dunn's objections notwithstanding. There are other important questions about Lewis's project that I have not answered. Is his analysis of duplication successful? Does the notion of naturalness make sense? Even if naturalness cannot be defined, can it be explained in an illuminating manner? Rather than taking one of the notions as primitive, should we analyze the notions in terms of some other extra-logical notion? Important questions, but questions for another time. |
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