Books received: volume 11, issue 2 |
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Authors: | Gary Banham |
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Affiliation: | 1. King's College London mark.textor@kcl.ac.uk |
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Abstract: | According to Bolzano, an object has necessary being if, and only if, there is a conceptual truth that ascribes being to it. I (Textor, 1996, chapter 5) proposed that the notion of conceptual truth bears the explanatory weight in Bolzano's theory of necessity because, ultimately, the truth of such a proposition depends only on the nature of the concepts it contains. Rusnock (2012) argues against this interpretation and proposes, in turn, that for Bolzano necessity and contingency are tied to free choice. In this article I will provide conceptual and historical background for Bolzano's view of necessity and use it to motivate my interpretation as well as to rebut Rusnock's criticism. |
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Keywords: | Bolzano concept condition ground intuition necessity |
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