Moral Competence, Moral Blame, and Protest |
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Authors: | Matthew Talbert |
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Institution: | (1) Department of Philosophy, West Virginia University, 230 Stansbury Hall, Morgantown, WV 26506-6286, USA |
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Abstract: | I argue that wrongdoers may be open to moral blame even if they lacked the capacity to respond to the moral considerations
that counted against their behavior. My initial argument turns on the suggestion that even an agent who cannot respond to
specific moral considerations may still guide her behavior by her judgments about reasons. I argue that this explanation of
a wrongdoer’s behavior can qualify her for blame even if her capacity for moral understanding is impaired. A second argument
is based on the observation that even when a blameworthy wrongdoer could have responded to moral considerations, this is often
not relevant to her blameworthiness. Finally, I argue against the view that because blame communicates moral demands, only
agents who can be reached by such communication are properly blamed. I contend that a person victimized by a wrongdoer with
an impaired capacity for moral understanding may protest her victimization in a way that counts as a form of moral blame even
though it does not primarily express a moral demand or attempt to initiate moral dialogue. |
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