Alternative Possibilities, Luck, and Moral Responsibility |
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Authors: | Ishtiyaque Haji |
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Affiliation: | (1) Department of Philosophy, Division of the Humanities, University of Minnesota, Morris, 600 East 4th Street, Morris, MN 56267, USA |
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Abstract: | I first question whether genuinealternatives are necessary for moralresponsibility by assessing the assumption thataccessibility to such alternatives is vital tohaving the kind of control required forresponsibility. I next suggest that theavailability of genuine alternatives courtsproblems of responsibility-subverting luck foran important class of libertarian theories. Isummarize one such problem and respond torecent replies it has elicited. I then proposethat if this ``luck objection' against theidentified class of libertarian theories ispersuasive, a similar objection appears toafflict compatibilist theories as well.Finally, I show that reflections on luck maywell take some bite out of variousFrankfurt-type examples. These are examplesdesigned to establish that an agent can bemorally responsible for an action despiteacting with libertarian free will in theabsence of genuine or pertinent alternatives. |
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Keywords: | alternative possibilities Frankfurt-type examples libertarianism luck moral responsibility proximal control ultimate origination |
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