Methodological naturalism and epistemic internalism |
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Authors: | Gregory Wheeler Luís Moniz Pereira |
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Affiliation: | (1) Artificial Intelligence Center – CENTRIA, Department of Computer Science, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, 2829-516 Caparica, Portugal |
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Abstract: | Epistemic naturalism holds that the results or methodologies from the cognitive sciences are relevant to epistemology, and some have maintained that scientific methods are more compatible with externalist theories of justification than with internalist theories. But practically all discussions about naturalized epistemology are framed exclusively in terms of cognitive psychology, which is only one of the cognitive sciences. The question addressed in this essay is whether a commitment to naturalism really does favor externalism over internalism, and we offer reasons for thinking that naturalism in epistemology is compatible with both internalist and externalist conceptions of justification. We also argue that there are some distinctively internalist aims that are currently being studied scientifically and these notions, and others, should be studied by scientific methods. This essay is dedicated to Deborah Mayo, who has long advocated using error statistical techniques to analyze and resolve epistemological puzzles in the philosophy of science. This essay follows the same spirit by advocating that computational concepts and techniques be applied within the heart of traditional, analytic epistemology. |
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Keywords: | Statistical default logic Evidentialism Coherentism Logic programming Applied logic |
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