Constructivism and the Inescapability of Moral Choices: A Response to Raskin and Debany

In their article on ethics, Raskin and Debany (this issue Raskin, J. D., &; Debany, A. E. (this issue). The inescapability of ethics and the impossibility of “anything goes”: A constructivist model of ethical meaning making. Journal of Constructivist Psychology. (Reprinted from Ethics in action: Dialogue between knowledge and practice (pp. 13–32), by S. Cipolletta &; E. Gius (Eds.), 2012, Milan, Italy: LED) [Google Scholar]) raise a number of important issues that merit discussion and have implications for a constructivist stance on ethics, an issue that has dogged constructivist and social constructionist theory and has, in the past, been the focus of a good deal of debate. In my response to their article, I focus on two issues before going on to consider what these imply for a constructivist ethics. The first is the status of “reality”; drawing on the work of French philosophers, discursive psychology, and symbolic interactionism, I argue that the constructivist conception of reality has been widely misunderstood and will outline what I regard as a defensible construction of reality. The second issue concerns the relationship between the individual and the social world; drawing again on earlier work in microsociology, I argue that the “constructed” individual must be understood as emerging from the social realm rather than preexisting it, and I argue for personal construct psychology as a candidate for filling the subjectivity “gap” in social constructionism. Finally, I use these conceptualizations of reality and the person to argue for an ethical stance of “radical doubt” for constructivism.