Warren, Plumwood, a Rock and a Snake: Some Doubts about Critical Ecological Feminism

In this paper I expound and criticise the arguments of two leading exponents of critical ecological feminism. According to critical ecological feminism responsibility for the oppressions of the natural world and the oppressions of racism and sexism can be traced to a logic of domination that is based on suspect value dualities and presupposes an unacceptable 'moral extensionism'(the view that moral status depends on membership of a specified class). I argue firstly that critical ecological feminism's critique of value dualism presupposes the truth of the thesis that humans and non-humans are morally equal, a thesis for which it offers no persuasive arguments (indeed critical ecological feminism advocates a kind of virtue ethic which is itself incompatible with such supposed equality). Secondly I maintain that moral extensionism, contrary to the claims of critical ecological feminism, can support a genuine respect for the natural world. Finally I suggest that the arguments for one version of critical ecological feminism, in order to be made convincing, themselves require the truth of moral extensionism.