Why Propositions Cannot be Sets of Truth-supporting Circumstances |
| |
Authors: | Scott Soames |
| |
Affiliation: | (1) School of Philosophy, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA, USA;(2) Mudd Hall of Philosophy, 3709 Trousdale Parkway, Los Angeles, CA 90089-0451, USA |
| |
Abstract: | No semantic theory satisfying certain natural constraints can identify the semantic contents of sentences (the propositions they express), with sets of circumstances in which the sentences are true–no matter how fine-grained the circumstances are taken to be. An objection to the proof is shown to fail by virtue of conflating model-theoretic consequence between sentences with truth-conditional consequence between the semantic contents of sentences. The error underlines the impotence of distinguishing semantics, in the sense of a truth-based theory of logical consequence, and semantics, in the sense of a theory of meaning. |
| |
Keywords: | propositions semantics semantic contents truth-supporting circumstances |
本文献已被 SpringerLink 等数据库收录! |
|