风险投资中的短视效应及理论解释

“投资者难以长远地将多重投资看作整体,而更倾向于分割成单一决策进而表现出每次决策风险规避的现象”被称为风险投资中的短视效应.短视/远视风险投资常通过单一决策/重复决策范式予以研究.大多数的研究发现,在单一决策条件下,投资者接受投资的人数比例或者投资金额低于重复决策条件.短视效应的调节机制有反馈频率、投资灵活性、选择组块、风险状况等.研究者分别提出短视损失厌恶（myopic loss aversion,简称MLA）理论和短视预期理论（myopic prospect theory,MPT）对短视现象进行解释;但这些理论受到基于齐当别理论（equate-to-differentiate theory）研究的挑战.文章在总结短视效应已有相关研究的基础上指出今后有必要深入探索的方向.

Myopic Effect in Risk Investment and its Theoretical Explanations

Short-run/long-run perspectives are operated as single-play/repeated-play which makes the effect as it is. Investors tend to be less willing to accept playing gambles or investment or invest less money in single-play conditions, compared with repeated-play conditions, which is called myopic effect. This effect could be moderated by feedback frequency, investment flexibility, choice bracketing and risk profile. Researchers have proposed several theories to explain it. The myopic loss aversion （MLA） theory combines two behavioral concepts-mental accounting and loss aversion. The myopic prospect theory （MPT） models myopic effect and reversed myopic effect. The MLA and MPT, however, are challenged by the equate-to-differentiate theory. This article first reviews research on the myopic effect and then puts forward future research directions, such as whether myopic loss aversion is the psychological mechanism that underlies myopic effect under single-play and repeated-play conditions, the neural basis of the myopic effect, and the quantitative model of the myopic effect.