Irrational Option Exclusion |
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Authors: | Sofia Jeppsson |
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Affiliation: | 1.Gothenburg Responsibility Project, Department of philosophy, linguistics and theory of science,University of Gothenburg/G?teborgs Universitet,G?teborg,Sweden |
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Abstract: | In this paper, I describe a hitherto overlooked kind of practical irrationality, which I call irrational option exclusion. An agent who suffers from this problem does not merely fail to act on her best judgement – she fails to realize that the superior action is even an option for her. I furthermore argue that this kind of irrationality is serious enough to undermine moral responsibility. I show that an agent suffering from this problem has compromised reasons-responsiveness, does not really express her will through action, and has a hard time doing otherwise; thus, from the standpoint of several popular moral responsibility theories, we ought to conclude that her responsibility is at the very least diminished. |
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