Drawing the boundary between low-level and high-level mindreading |
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Authors: | Frédérique de Vignemont |
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Institution: | (1) Institut Jean-Nicod, EHESS – ENS – CNRS, 29 rue d’Ulm, 75005 Paris, France |
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Abstract: | The philosophical world is indebted to Alvin Goldman for a number of reasons, and among them, his defense of the relevance
of cognitive science for philosophy of mind. In Simulating minds, Goldman discusses with great care and subtlety a wide variety of experimental results related to mindreading from cognitive
neuroscience, cognitive psychology, social psychology and developmental psychology. No philosopher has done more to display
the resourcefulness of mental simulation. I am sympathetic with much of the general direction of Goldman’s theory. I agree
with him that mindreading is not a single system based on a single mechanism. And I admire his attempt to bring together the
cognitive neuroscientific discovery of mirror system phenomena and the philosophical account of pretense within a unique theoretical
framework of mental simulation. To do so, Goldman distinguishes two types of mindreading, respectively, based on low-level
and high-level simulation. Yet, I wonder in what sense they are really two distinct processes. Here, I will confine myself
largely to spelling out a series of points that take issue with the distinction between low-level and high-level mindreading. |
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Keywords: | Mirroring Pretense Empathy Automaticity Reliability |
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