| Abstract: | Experiments that test for the judgmental bias that results from a preference for cognitive consistency often contain two threats to their internal validity. First, the subjects are asked to make judgments about themselves. Thus, the biases that result may be explained in terms of cognitive consistency or the motivation to see oneself in a positive light. Second, the decision subjects are asked to make is often difficult to verify objectively. The present research sought evidence in support of cognitive consistency using a methodology that avoided these two confounds. The context chosen was the tendency of perceivers to use the outcome of a group decision to make inferences about the magnitude of group members’ support for the outcome. The present experiment examined whether people in Richmond, Virginia, would use the outcome of a gubernatorial election to make decisions regarding the percentage of people in favor of the winning candidate. Although the winner won by less than one-half of one percent of the popular vote, we found that the subjects significantly overestimated the degree of voter support he received and underestimated the degree of support his opponent received. Moreover, this tendency was exacerbated over time. |
