Time pressure and strategic choice in mediation

The present study simulated a dispute to examine the influence of time pressure on mediator behavior and to test P. J. Carnevale's (1986, Negotiation Journal, 2, 41–56) strategic choice model of mediation. Time available for negotiation, mediator concern for the disputants' aspirations, and perceived probability of a mutually acceptable agreement were varied in a 2 × 2 × 2 design. The results generally supported the strategic choice model. As predicted, compensating occurred most when the mediators' estimate of likely agreement was low and concern for the parties' aspirations was high. Inaction occurred most when the mediators' estimate of likely agreement was high and concern for the parties' aspirations was low. Integrating occurred most in the high concern conditions. Pressing tactics occurred most when the mediators' estimate of likely agreement was low and concern for the parties' aspirations was also low. As a deadline neared, mediators increased their use of pressing and compensating, and decreased their use of integrating. In addition, the manipulations of time pressure and mediator estimate of likely agreement interacted to produce an increase in pressing over time. Consistent with predictions of the strategic choice model, the data suggest that mediators' beliefs about the likelihood of a mutually acceptable agreement mediate the relationship between time pressure and the use of pressing tactics.