Virtuous Choice and Parity |
| |
Authors: | Barbro Fr?ding Martin Peterson |
| |
Institution: | (1) Lincoln College, Ox1 3dr Oxford, UK;(2) Section of Philosophy & Ethics, Eindhoven University of Technology, P.O Box 513, IPO 1.04, 5600 MB Eindhoven, The Netherlands |
| |
Abstract: | This article seeks to contribute to the discussion on the nature of choice in virtue theory. If several different actions
are available to the virtuous agent, they are also likely to vary in their degree of virtue, at least in some situations.
Yet, it is widely agreed that once an action is recognised as virtuous there is no higher level of virtue. In this paper we
discuss how the virtue theorist could accommodate both these seemingly conflicting ideas. We discuss this issue from a modern
Aristotelian perspective, as opposed to a purely exegetic one. We propose a way of resolving what seems to be a major clash
between two central features of virtue ethics. Our proposal is based on the notion of parity, a concept which recently has
received considerable attention in the literature on axiology. Briefly put, two alternatives are on a par (or are ‘roughly
equal’) if they are comparable, although it is not the case that one is better than the other, nor that they are equally good.
The advantages of applying the concept of parity to our problem are twofold. Firstly, it sheds new light on the account of
choice in virtue theory. Secondly, some of the criticisms that have been mounted against the possibility of parity can be
countered by considering the notion of choice from a virtue theory perspective. |
| |
Keywords: | |
本文献已被 SpringerLink 等数据库收录! |
|