| Abstract: | In this paper we investigated the interplay of self‐interest and equity concerns in coalition formation by manipulating the number of units in which the coalition payoff is made available, and by manipulating the way people are allowed to interact. Results of three experiments showed that when the coalition payoff was such that members of each possible coalition could obtain an equitable payoff share, the outcome tended to be coalitions that also maximized the payoff of its members. However, when the payoff was such that people had to make trade‐offs between maximizing their payoff share and obtaining an equitable payoff share, it took longer to form a coalition and it was harder to maintain a coalition. Moreover, depending on the way people were allowed to interact, the final outcome was a coalition that maximized the payoff of its members or a coalition that provided them with an equitable payoff share. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. |
