Kant and the transparency of the mind |
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Authors: | Alexandra M. Newton |
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Affiliation: | 1. Department of Philosophy, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Champaign-Urbana, IL, USAamnewton@illinois.eduhttps://orcid.org/0000-0002-7491-9728 |
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Abstract: | ABSTRACTIt has become standard to treat Kant’s characterization of pure apperception as involving the claim that questions about what I think are transparent to questions about the world. By contrast, empirical apperception is thought to be non-transparent, since it involves a kind of inner observation of my mental states. I propose a reading that reverses this: pure apperception is non-transparent, because conscious only of itself, whereas empirical apperception is transparent to the world. The reading I offer, unlike the standard one, can accommodate Kant’s claim that the I of pure apperception is the same as the I of empirical apperception. |
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Keywords: | Self-consciousness transparency apperception Kant Sartre Evans |
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