Propositional knowledge and know-how |
| |
Authors: | John N Williams |
| |
Institution: | (1) School of Social Sciences, Singapore Management University, 90 Stamford Road, Singapore, 178903, Singapore |
| |
Abstract: | This paper is roughly in two parts. The first deals with whether know-how is constituted by propositional knowledge, as discussed
primarily by Gilbert Ryle (1949) The concept of mind. London: Hutchinson, Jason Stanley and Timothy Williamson (2001). Knowing
how. Journal of Philosophy, 98, pp. 411–444 as well as Stephen Hetherington (2006). How to know that knowledge-that is knowledge-how. In S. Hetherington
(Ed.) Epistemology futures. Oxford: Oxford University Press. The conclusion of this first part is that know-how sometimes does and sometimes does not
consist in propositional knowledge. The second part defends an analysis of know-how inspired by Katherine Hawley’ (2003).
Success and knowledge-how. American Philosophical Quarterly, 40, pp. 19–31, insightful proposal that know-how requires counterfactual success. I conclude by showing how this analysis helps
to explain why know-how sometimes does and sometimes does not consist of propositional knowledge. |
| |
Keywords: | Knowing how Propositional knowledge Counterfactual success Ability Reliable methods Ryle Hawley Hetherington Williamson Stanley Lewis |
本文献已被 SpringerLink 等数据库收录! |
|