The limits of conceivability: logical cognitivism and the language faculty |
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Authors: | John Collins |
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Institution: | (1) Department of Philosophy, Durham University, 50 Old Elvet, Durham, DH1 3HN, United Kingdom;(2) Department of Linguistics, University of Maryland, 1102 Marie Mount Hall, College Park, MD 20742, USA |
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Abstract: | Robert Hanna (Rationality and logic. MIT Press, Cambridge, 2006) articulates and defends the thesis of logical cognitivism, the claim that human logical competence is grounded in a cognitive faculty (in Chomsky’s sense) that is not naturalistically
explicable. This position is intended to steer us between the Scylla of logical Platonism and the Charybdis of logical naturalism
(/psychologism). The paper argues that Hanna’s interpretation of Chomsky is mistaken. Read aright, Chomsky’s position offers
a defensible version of naturalism, one Hanna may accept as far as his version of naturalism goes, although not one that supports
the claim that cognitive science offers a place for logic that is somehow outside the natural, contingent order. |
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