The Virtue of Dialogue,Dialogue as Virtue in Plato's Protagoras

Abstract

This article interprets Plato's Protagoras as a defense, against the claim of the sophists to possess a skill of teaching virtue, of Socrates’ claim in the Apology (38a) that the greatest good for a human being is examining oneself and others every day with regard to virtue. Attention to the often-neglected complex series of prologues as well as the dispute about method at the dialogue's center shows both the erotic and the dialogical character of Socratic virtue. Specifically, human virtue turns out to be a process of becoming as opposed to being good that can be carried out only in constant dialogue with others. In this context, the ‘science of measurement’ Socrates describes on behalf of Protagoras and the other sophists is exposed for what it is: a delusion that continues to exert its power over us today on account of the recurrent human wish to possess a skill or technique that could save us by guaranteeing the goodness and happiness of our lives.