Conditionals and theory change: Revisions,expansions, and additions |
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Authors: | Hans Rott |
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Institution: | (1) Seminar für Philosophie, Logik und Wissenschaftstheorie, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Ludwigstraße 31, D-8000 München 22, West Germany |
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Abstract: | This paper dwells upon formal models of changes of beliefs, or theories, which are expressed in languages containing a binary conditional connective. After defining the basic concept of a (non-trivial) belief revision model. I present a simple proof of Gärdenfors's (1986) triviality theorem. I claim that on a proper understanding of this theorem we must give up the thesis that consistent revisions ( additions ) are to be equated with logical expansions. If negated or might conditionals are interpreted on the basis of autoepistemic omniscience , or if autoepistemic modalities (Moore) are admitted, even more severe triviality results ensue. It is argued that additions cannot be philosophically construed as parasitic (Levi) on expansions. In conclusion I outline somed logical consequences of the fact that we must not expect monotonic revisions in languages including conditionals.I wish to thank Peter Gärdenfors for a number of helpful comments, André Fuhrmann and Wolfgang Spohn for extensive discussion of parts of this paper, and Winfred Klink for kindly checking my English. |
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