A Pragmatic Case against Pragmatic Scientific Realism |
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Authors: | Wang-Yen Lee |
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Institution: | (1) Department of History and Philosophy of Science, University of Cambridge, Free School Lane, Cambridge, CB2 3RH, UK |
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Abstract: | Pragmatic Scientific Realism (PSR) urges us to take up the realist aim or the goal of truth although we have good reason to
think that the goal can neither be attained nor approximated. While Newton-Smith thinks that pursuing what we know we cannot
achieve is clearly irrational, Rescher disagrees and contends that pursuing an unreachable goal can be rational on pragmatic
grounds—if in pursuing the unreachable goal one can get indirect benefits. I have blocked this attempt at providing a pragmatic
justification for the realist aim of PSR on precisely the same pragmatic grounds—since there is a competing alternative to
PSR, and the alternative can provide whatever indirect benefits PSR can offer while being less risky than it is, prudential
reasoning favours the alternative to PSR. This undermines the pragmatic case for the realist aim of science since the instrumentalist
alternative does not aim at the truth. |
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Keywords: | Pragmatism Scientific realism Constructive empiricism Instrumentalism Nicholas Rescher |
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