Analytical Dispositionalism and Practical Reason |
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Authors: | Hallvard Lillehammer |
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Institution: | (1) Kings College London, The Strand, London, WC2R 2LS, UK |
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Abstract: | The paper examines the plausibility of analytical dispositionalism about practical reason, according to which the following claims are conceptual truths about common sense ethical discourse: i) Ethics: agents have reasons to act in some ways rather than others, and ii) Metaphysical Modesty: there is no such thing as a response independent normative reality. By elucidating two uncontroversial assumptions which are fundamental to the common sense commitment to ethics, I argue that common sense ethical discourse is most plausibly construed as committed to the denial of metaphysical modesty, and thereby as committed to the existence of a response independent normative reality. |
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Keywords: | conceptual analysis dispositionalism metaphysical revision normative reasons practical reason |
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