Moral judgment purposivism: saving internalism from amoralism |
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Authors: | M S Bedke |
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Institution: | (1) Department of Philosophy, University of Arizona, Social Science Bldg., Rm 213, Tucson, AZ 85721, USA |
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Abstract: | Consider orthodox motivational judgment internalism: necessarily, A’s sincere moral judgment that he or she ought to φ motivates
A to φ. Such principles fail because they cannot accommodate the amoralist, or one who renders moral judgments without any
corresponding motivation. The orthodox alternative, externalism, posits only contingent relations between moral judgment and
motivation. In response I first revive conceptual internalism by offering some modifications on the amoralist case to show
that certain community-wide motivational failures are not conceptually possible. Second, I introduce a theory of moral motivation
that supplements the intuitive responses to different amoralist cases. According to moral judgment purposivism (MJP), in rough
approximation, a purpose of moral judgments is to motivate corresponding behaviors such that a mental state without this purpose
is not a moral judgment. MJP is consistent with conceptual desiderata, provides an illuminating analysis of amoralist cases,
and offers a step forward in the internalist-externalist debates.
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Keywords: | Internalism Externalism Evolutionary ethics Amoralism Cognitivism Expressivism Noncognitivism Proper function |
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