Logical versus psychological necessity: A discussion of the role of common sense in psychological theory

Smedslund's has argued that psychological theory should be concerned with the logical analysis of common sense since (a) empirical data are "arbitrary" and no general and empirical laws can exist when it comes to human action; and (b) theoretical explanation of data is likely to be empirically empty—psychological theory often cannot be falsified. The argument was supported mainly by an analysis of Bandura's self-efficacy conceptions. Bandura's approach is, however, not developed to the point of being an explicit theory, a fact that explains why it can be demonstrated as being non-distinguishable from the naive analysis of action. Many well developed theories of decision making, such as Tversky's EBA theory, transcend common sense and are falsifiable. Common sense is, furthermore, subject to change over time and differs between cultures, and even between individuals. There is no such things as the common sense. It is also inconsistent and ambiguous and uses a loose mode of thinking which can often provide post hoc explanations but no predictions. Therefore, common sense probably offers little in the way of profound insights. Furthermore, the problems of inferrring general laws from unique events have not stifled progress in the natural sciences and should not discourage psychologists. The case for general laws in psychology is still being heard. Besides, even if findings are restricted in time and space they concern important questions of how people act here and now. Finally, Smedslund's attempt at logical analysis of treatment rules is shown to provide little more than semantic explication of the chosen definitions of key terms; in no way can such explication serve as a substitute for empirical research on psychotherapy effects.