Counterfactuals and Epistemic Probability |
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Authors: | R Otte |
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Institution: | (1) Department of Philosophy, Cowell College, University of California, Santa Cruz, CA, 95064, U.S.A |
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Abstract: | Philosophers have often attempted to use counterfactual conditionals to analyze probability. This article focuses on counterfactual
analyzes of epistemic probability by Alvin Plantinga and Peter van Inwagen. I argue that a certain type of counterfactual
situation creates problems for these analyses. I then argue that Plantinga’s intuition about the role of warrant in epistemic
probability is mistaken. Both van Inwagen’s and Plantinga’s intuitions about epistemic probability are flawed. |
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